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Roman Roots of the Louisiana Law of Slavery:
Emancipation in American Louisiana, 1803-1857
Judith Kelleher Schafer*
The influence of Roman law on the Louisiana law of slavery between 1803
and 1857, especially after 1825, seems more profound than a closer look
suggests. Prior to the Louisiana Purchase, France imposed the Code Noir on its
colonies in 1685 and 1724, and Spain imposed the Codigo N6gro on Louisiana
in 1777 and 1784. Both France and Spain borrowed from Roman law in writing
their codes when it furthered the imperial ambitions of these two major European
powers. When Louisiana became an American possession, the leading citizens
of the new territory found themselves in a position to make their own laws, and
they chose to protect the institution of slavery by using those aspects of Roman
law that furthered the security of slavery and by discarding those that did not.
Especially in the writing of laws concerning the manumission of slaves, they
chose to include superficial elements of Roman law, while creating a
fundamentally new system of slave law.
The most important survival of Roman law in the law of slavery in
antebellum Louisiana was the concept of redhibition. Originally developed by
the Romans to protect purchasers of slaves from the shoddy practices of Roman
slave traders, the implied warranty-a warranty of quality given to the
purchaser-meant that buyers of slaves found not to be as represented at the time
of the sale could have the sale legally rescinded and the slave returned to the
seller or could have an adjustment of the price to reflect the diminished value of
the slave.' Louisiana legislators retained redhibition throughout the antebellum
period because Louisiana was a major slave importer in the domestic slave trade.
Many slave sales involved two transactions-the initial sale by the slave owner
to the trader and a subsequent sale by the dealer to a new owner. These two
transfers often took place in different states. As expected, the law of slave sales
favored the seller in exporting states, such as Virginia or Maryland, and favored
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the purchaser in slave importing states, such as Louisiana. The number of slaves
brought into Louisiana greatly exceeded those sent elsewhere for sale during the
antebellum period, and, therefore, state lawmakers retained the Roman-law
heritage in slave sales because it benefitted the interests of the slaveholding class.
Other features of Roman slave law, such as those that granted slaves the capacity
to own inherited property, make loans, and pay debts, were inconsistent with the
interests of Louisiana slave owners, and therefore lawmakers never integrated
them into territorial or state law after the Louisiana Purchase.'
Roman and Louisiana slave law differed in a fundamental way. While
slaves at Roman law might have been of any race or ethnicity--originally they
were captives taken in the wars of the Roman Empire-in American Louisiana
race and slave status became inseparably intertwined. Thus, although there was
a higher percentage of slaves as compared to free people in Rome-thirty-five
to forty percent at the end of the Republic to about thirty-three percent in the
American South at the height of slavery-the two systems of bondage had vastly
different theoretical foundations. While in Rome, slave status had little to do
with race, background, or education-'a misfortune that could happen to
anyone" -skin color had become the crucial factor in determining slave status
in Louisiana by 1803. The association of race with slave status in Louisiana
insured that regulations and restrictions upon emancipation would develop very
differently, making manumission much more difficult than in Rome.
Although Louisianians had made slaves of American Indians in the Spanish
period, by the time of the Louisiana Purchase the law presumed Indians to be
free. In 1820, Judge Frangois-Xavier Martin, the presiding judge of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana wrote the decision of Ulzere v. Poeyfarri,4 declaring that
Indians could not be enslaved in Louisiana. His decision confirmed what was
already a fact: that slave status in Louisiana included only those of African
origin, although not all of African origin were slaves. The Superior Court of the
Territory of Orleans had held in the 1809 decision of Adele v. Beauregard that
a legal presumption existed that mulattoes were presumed to be free and Negroes
were presumed to be slaves unless proven otherwise.'
. Slaves in Rome were often well educated by Roman standards, and many
worked as doctors, artisans, and businessmen. Allowing education and
2. Andrew Fede, Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the U S. South: A Caveat Concerning
Caveat Emptor, 31 Am. J. Legal Hist. 322 (1987); Buckland, supra note 1, at 190-91; Leonard
Oppenheim, The Law of Slaves-A Comparative Study of the Roman and Louisiana Systems, 14 Tul.
L. Rev. 384 (1940); A Digest of the Civil Law Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans Tit. VI,
Chap. IN1, Sec. III, Art. 78, at 358 (1808) [hereinafter Digest of 1808].
3. Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law 3 (1987) [hereinafter Watson, Roman Slave Law]; Alan
Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law 116 (1991) [hereinafter Watson, Roman Law].
4. Ulzcre v. Poeyfarrt, No. 468, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 155 (La. 1820). See also Seville v. Chritien, No.
21, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 275 (La. 1817).
5. Stephen Webre, The Problem ofIndian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1803,25 La. Hist.
117-35 (1984); Ulzere v. Poeyfarr6, No. 468, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 155 (La. 1820); Adele v. Beauregard, I
Mart. (o.s.) 183 (La. 1810).
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employment at a level much higher than simple manual labor meant that fewer
obstacles to manumission existed in Rome because freed slaves already had a
place in society. Being a slave in Rome did not inspire the assumption that
servile status went hand-in-hand with a lack of intelligence, education, or
integrity. Nor could Roman citizens distinguish between slaves and free people
merely by sight. The justification for enslaving Africans in Louisiana rested on
an assumption of inferiority. Since most Louisiana slaves performed manual
labor on the state's plantations and farms, few received even the most
rudimentary education. Indeed, by 1830 the Louisiana legislature made it a
crime to teach slaves to read and write.' This restriction served to reinforce
Louisianians' belief in the racial inferiority of slaves 7
Finally, whereas emancipated slaves in Rome became Roman 'citizens, a
highly prized designation, emancipated slaves in Louisiana did .not become
Louisiana citizens. Ultimately, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney addressed this
question on a national level in the fateful decision of Dred Scott v. Sanford:l
"[T]hey (blacks) are not included, under the word 'citizen' in the Constitution,
and therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States."9
How did a person acquire slave status in Rome and in Louisiana? Initially,
the most frequent way in Rome was conquest by the Roman army-which
reduced captives to slave status, an action seen as less heinous than execution.
Birth to a slave mother also conferred slave status under the Roman system.
Occasionally, the Romans used enslavement as a punishment for certain crimes,
such as evading military service. But in Louisiana, black skin implied slave
status unless proven to the contrary. Children born to a slave mother also
became slaves. Africans taken aboard slave ships bound for the Americas almost
always spent the rest of their lives as slaves. Although Roman law envisioned
perpetual servitude, by the fifth or sixth century, the grandchildren of former
slaves gained freedom, as did the children of slave mothers and free fathers. 0
Roman slaves could gain their freedom in three ways, all of which reflected
the tolerance of Rome to manumission. The first of these, manumissio
censu-manumission by census--occurred when a slave's owner allowed a slave
to register as a Roman citizen on the census. Census takers'did not ordinarily
enroll slaves on the census; therefore, enrollment meant that those included had
6. 1830 La. Acts § 3, at 96 (An Act to Punish the Crimes Therein Mentioned, and for Other
Purposes).
7. Watson, Roman Slave Law, supra note 3, at 9. 1830 La. Acts § 3, at 96 (An Act to Punish
the Crimes Therein Mentioned, and for Other Purposes). Alan Watson, Slave Law in the Americas
(1989).
8. Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 75; Dred Scott v. Sanford. 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 404 (1857).
9. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404.




the highly prized status of free citizens of Rome. Another rather informal way
to free a slave in Rome, vindicado in libertatum, occurred when a slave claimed
to be a free person wrongly held as a slave. In a hearing before a magistrate,
a slave's owner would not mount a defense. The court would, therefore, declare
the individual free. The third and most formal way to free a Roman slave was
by will, manumissio testamento. At times, slaves designated to be freed in their
owners' will had to fulfill certain conditions, such as serving the heirs for a
period of time or paying a designated amount to the heirs. Until a slave met the
conditions, Roman law termed them statuliberi, that is, a slave who although not
yet free, had acquired the right to be free at a later time."
Although Roman slaves could not own property, most owners allowed their
slaves to administer the peculium, a fund granted by a slave owner for a slave's
use. Since slaves could engage in commerce, they could increase the amount of
the peculium by careful management, and in some cases, raise enough money to
purchase themselves. Slaveholders often encouraged this practice because it
stimulated slaves to work diligently to gain their purchase price and because
slave owners could buy other slaves of the same value. More importantly, a
peculium gave a slave self-respect as well as an important incentive to work hard
and serve the master well.'2
Roman law placed few restrictions on manumission. Only actual owners of
slaves could free them, and owners could not free their slaves to defraud their
creditors. Additionally, slave owners could not free slaves under the age of
thirty, and a manumitting slaveholder had to have attained the age of twenty-five.
By the eighth century, manumission by will had produced so many freed men
and women that the law prohibited slave owners from freeing more than a certain
proportion of their slaves by testament: one-half if they owned up to ten slaves,
one-third if they owned no more than thirty, and one-fourth if they held up to
100.13 Finally, Roman law had a predisposition in favorem libertatis-in favor
of freedom. Although the courts in antebellum Louisiana used that term in a few
decisions, the overwhelming culture of slavery in Louisiana did not favor
emancipation.'4
As Professor Baade's excellent work demonstrates, the laws of France
initially placed few restrictions on manumission in their colonies. Slave owners
over the age of twenty could free their slaves practically at will, or they could
11. Watson, Roman Slave Law, supra note 3, at 24-25, 34; Watson, Roman Law, supra note 3,
at 42, 116. Although entirely different in origin, emancipated slaves in the United States had their
names on the United States Census by first and last name, gender, age, and color, as did whites,
although this did not confer citizenship. Slaves were only listed under their owners' names by age,
gender, and color, but not by either given names or surnames. Declarcuil, supra note 10, at 131-32;
Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 392-93.
12. Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 390-91; Watson, Roman Slave Law, supra note 3, at 95-96.
13. Declareuil, supra note 10, at 132-33; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 392-93.
14. For example, see Cuffy v. Castillon, No. 225, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 494 (La. 1818); Marie Louise,
f.w.c. v. Marot, No. 2748, 8 La. 475 (1835).
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achieve enfranchisement by designating slaves they wished to free as heirs,
executors, or guardians of the owners' children, duties only free people could
perform. However, the 1724 Code Noir required governmental permission to
free a slave. It also invalidated manumission by instituting a slave as an heir.
Additionally, the 1724 Code Noir raised the age of the manumitting owner to
twenty-five and required legitimate reasons for manumitting slaves to be
presented to the Conseil Sup6rieur, the governing body of the colony. No
provision for self-purchase existed, as the code prohibited slaves from owning
property or contracting in their own names.S
Spanish law borrowed more heavily from those aspects of Roman law that
were not hostile to freedom for slaves. Slaves could purchase themselves and
their families, and Spanish law allowed them a peculium to use for this purpose.
The requirement for official permission and a justifiable reason for emancipation
disappeared in Spanish Louisiana. Owners emancipated more than 1,000 slaves
in the thirty-three active years of Spanish rule.'6
Although Pierre Cl6ment de Laussat reenacted the Code Noir of 1724 during
the twenty days that he took over Louisiana for France, the subsequent
possession of Louisiana by the Americans threw the law for slaves as well as for
free people into confusion. Although the Code Noir prohibited self-purchase and
manumission without governmental consent, for manumission went on much as
usual between 1804 and 1807, with approximately fifty slaves gaining freedom
each year, for a total of 200 in four years. None of the records of these
emancipations include any evidence of governmental permission or justifiable
reasons for manumission.'"
On June 7, 1806, the legislature of the Territory of Orleans enacted a
comprehensive Black Code. Principally concerned with the discipline and
regulation of slaves, the Black Code did not specifically mention manumission.
It did, however, prohibit slaves from owning any property: "That as the person
of a slave belongs to his master, no slave can possess any thing in his own right,
or dispose in any way of the produce of his industry, without the consent of his
master."'"
The 1806 Black Code contained an ominous warning for free persons of
color. Section 40 of the Black Code warned:
That free people of colour ought never to insult or strike white people,
nor presume to conceive themselves equal to the white; but on the
contrary that they ought to yield to them in every occasion, and never
speak or answer to them but with respect...9
15. Hans W. Baade, The Law of Slavery in Spanish Luislana, in Louisiana's Legal Heritage, 48-49
(Edward F. Haas ed., 1983).
16. Id. at 51, 60-61, 68-70.
17. Id. at 72-73.
18. 1806 La. Acts § 15, at 158 (An Act Prescribing the Rules and Conduct to Be Observed with
Respect to Negroes and other Slaves of This Territory) [hereinafter Black Code].
19. Id. § 40, at 188-90.
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The French Code Noir had also required emancipated slaves to show special
respect for their former owners: "We command those enfranchised to show
special respect towards their former masters, towards the widow and children of
same, as any injury to them will be punished more severely. than to another."''
Perhaps drawing on Roman law, this provision echoes the respect Roman law
required freed slaves to show to their former owners, called obsequium.
Although ostensibly the same concept, Roman and French law required respect
that reflected the gratitude of former slaves to the person who freed them,
whereas the requirement in the American Black Code, an order to repect all
whites, not just the ones who freed them, seems designed more to reinforce white
superiority by keeping persons who were free but not white in their place."'
In 1807, Louisiana legislators passed a law specifically to regulate
manumission. The first section demolished the most important right of slaves
in Spanish Louisiana and departed from Roman law by abolishing the right of
self purchase: "That no person shall be compelled either directly or indirectly,
to emancipate his or her slave or slaves." 2  Although lawmakers kept the
Roman law tradition of requiring slaves to be thirty years of age, the act of 1807
added the requirement that they must have demonstrated "honest conduct" for
four years prior to the emancipation. Running away or committing a criminal
act automatically disqualified a slave for manumission. These restrictions did not
apply if a slave had saved the life of his or her owner or the owner's family.'
The act of 1807 required manumitting slave owners to declare their intention to
free a slave to a judge of the county and to guarantee that the slave had the age
and conduct required for emancipation. Judges then had the duty to post a notice
of the slave owner's intentions, and persons objecting to the emancipation had
forty days to file opposition.2 If not contested and if the judge ascertained that
the emancipation would not defraud the slave owner's creditors (another
borrowing from Roman law)," the emancipation could proceed. The act
provided for a $100 fine if slave owners did not meet proscribed requirements.
Manumitting slave owners had the obligation to support their freed slaves if they
became ill or were otherwise unable to support themselves. Finally, the act
required that persons seeking to emancipate their slaves by testament to abide by
all of the requirements of the act of 1807.26
20. Regulations, Edicts, Declarations and Decrees Concerning the Commerce, Administration of
Justice, and Policing of Louisiana and Other French Colonies in America, Together with the Black
Code § 63, at 126-27 (1724).
21. Black Code, supra note 18, § 40, at 188-90. Watson, Roman Law, supra note 3, at 43.
22. 1807 La. Acts § 1, at 80 (An Act to Regulate the Conditions and Forms of the Emancipation
of Slaves).
23. Id. §§ 1-2, at 82-84.; Watson, Roman Slave Law, supra note 3, at 29.
24. 1807 La. Acts §§ 2-3, at 82-86 (An Act to Regulate the Conditions and Forms of the
Emancipation of Slaves).
25. Dclareuil, supra note 10, at 132.




The Louisiana Digest of 1808, an attempt to put the existing law for the
Territory of Orleans into written form, reiterated the limitations of the 1806
Black Code and the provisions of the act of 1807 concerning emancipation. The
Digest of 1808 confirmed the legal disabilities of slaves in the territory,
prohibiting them from "contracting any kind of engagement. '27 It also deprived
slaves of the right to own any property: "He [the slave] can possess nothing in
his own right and can transmit nothing by succession, legacy or otherwise; for
whatever he possesses, is his master's property.12 Howeyer, the Digest of
1808 did not deny slaves the right to sue for their own freedom:
The slave is incapable of exercising any public office or private trusts,
he cannot be tutor, curator, executor, nor attorney, he cannot be a
witness in civil or criminal matters ... He cannot be a party in any
civil action either as plaintiff or defendant, except when he has to claim
or prove his freedom.29
The Digest of 1808 contained three articles concerning the emancipation of
slaves, all reiterating the act regulating emancipation passed by the territorial
legislature in 1807. Article 25 allowed owners to free their slaves during their
lifetimes or by testament, but the article required all such emancipations to
follow the forms and conditions set by the legislature. Article 25 also forbade
the Roman practice of emancipating slaves by instituting them as heirs or
executors in slave owners' wills.3" Article 26 followed the Roman restriction
of forbidding the emancipation of slaves in fraud of creditors or slaves whose
owners had mortgaged them.3' Article 27 specified the only instance in which
the territory could force slave owners to free slaves. If the legislature recognized
a slave's meritorious act, the lawmakers could declare the slave free and
compensate the owner for his or her appraised value. Article 27 also stated two
instances which forced slave owners to sell their slaves. If two or more persons
owned a slave and one of them demanded a partition of the property, the owners
had to sell the slave and divide the proceeds. As in Roman law, if a court
convicted slave owners of excessive cruelty toward their slaves, the judge could
order the sale of a slave "to place him out of reach of the power which his
master has abused. 32
In 1825, Louisiana lawmakers approved the Projet of the Civil Code of
Louisiana of 1825 (Civil Code of 1825) that reiterated and expanded the number
of articles involving the emancipation of slaves from three to ten. In Article 184,
the redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 copied Article 25 of the Digest of 1808.
27. Digest of 1808, supra note 2, art. 17, at 40.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 26, at 42.
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 27, at 42; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 388.
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Under this article, emancipations had to follow the forms and conditions required
by the legislature. Additionally, appointing slaves as heirs or executors could not
free them.3 Article 186 reinstated the requirement of the act of 1807 and the
Digest of 1808, taken from Roman law, that slaves attain the age thirty years
before their owners could free them. Article 186 also reinstated the requirement
that slaves exhibit "honest conduct" for four years preceding the emancipation."'
However, the next article waived the age requirement if a slave had saved the
life of an owner or an owner's family.35 Article 187 kept the procedure of
emancipating slaves-judicial notice and a waiting period for objections. 3'The Civil Code of 1825 introduced two entirely new provisions concerning
emancipation that did not appear in the Digest of 1808. Article 189 stated that
"[a]n emancipation once perfected, is irrevocable on the part of the master or his
heirs."37 This provision is strikingly similar to Roman law, which held that
"[1]iberty, once effected, is irrevocable."38 The other new provision, which first
appeared in the act of 1807, presented another obstacle to manumission. Article188 required emancipating owners to support freed slaves, should they prove
unable to support themselves. 9
For the first time in American Louisiana, the Civil Code of 1825 allowed
slaves a right borrowed directly from Roman law, the right to a peculium: "All
that a slave possesses, belongs to his master; he possesses nothing of his own
except his peculium, that is to say, the sum of money, or movable estate, whichhis master chooses he should possess."'" The Projet of the Civil Code of
Louisiana of 1825 gave only a brief explanation for the addition of this article.
"What is here proposed is by no means new. The Roman law contains similar
dispositions; and we are here in the habit of permitting our slaves to enjoy what
they acquire by their industry." ' In practice, however, the acquisition of this
right did little to change the position of Louisiana slaves. In ancient Rome,
slaves engaged in commerce, doing most of the secretarial and clerical work. In
some cases, the careful management of the peculium by a Roman slave provided
a sum great enough for the slave to work at a trade. In this way, the peculium
helped slaves in Rome overcome many of the legal disabilities under which they
33. La. Civ. Code art. 29 (1825).
34. La. Civ. Code art. 185 (1825).
35. La. Civ. Code art. 186 (1825).
36. La. Civ. Code art. 187 (1825).
37. La. Civ. Code art. 189 (1825).
38. La. Civ. Code art. 189 (1825). Buckland, supra note i, at 485, 566. The Supreme Court ofLouisiana upheld this provision in Maples v. Mitty and Sarah, f.w.c., No. 4985, 12 La. Ann. 759
(1857).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 188 (1825). 1807 La. Acts § 5, at 86 (An Act to Regulate the Conditions
and Terms of the Emancipation of Slaves).
40. La. Civ. Code art. 175 (1825).




labored. 2 However, in American Louisiana the restrictions on the education,
training, and physical mobility of slaves reduced the right of having a peculium
to one of little importance in ameliorating the condition of Louisiana slaves.
Although slaveholders had the obligation to pay their slaves for work performed
on Sunday, many slave owners gave their slaves Sundays off; therefore, slaves
lost the opportunity to accumulate any significant funds. One great exception to
this is the case of John McDonogh, a wealthy New Orleans merchant.
McDonogh allowed his slaves to work for wages at night and on Sundays. In
1842, he allowed eighty-four of his slaves to purchase their freedom. Before his
neighbors knew his intentions, they gossiped that McDonogh was either a clever
or a cruel master to inspire his slaves to work so enthusiastically for such long
hours. By the time of his death in 1850, forty-one more slaves had purchased
themselves with their labor, and his will provided for their emancipation. 3
However, the concept of the slave's peculium does not appear in McDonogh's
will. Indeed, thousands of trial court and appellate cases involving slaves in
American Louisiana make no mention of the peculium."
The Civil Code of 1825 also granted slaves another new right, the right to
contract for their freedom: "The slave is incapable of making any kind of
contract, except those which relate to his own emancipation."'" The redactors
of the code explained:
The object here proposed is to render a slave capable of making a
contract for his own emancipation. At present, stipulations to this effect
cannot be made; this difficulty ought to be removed ... . Besides, this
amendment is in accordance with the provision that authorizes slaves to
appear in court for the purpose of claiming their libetty."
The right to contract for freedom, a legacy of Roman and Spanish law, in reality
acted as a watered down version of its predecessors. Article 174 did not force
slaves' owners to sell them, even if a slave managed to gather the purchase
price, a difficult task since slaves could accumulate money and other movable
property only with consent of their owners. Also, Louisiana slaves who
attempted to purchase themselves found that as immovable property, they were
bound by the same rules governing any transfer of real estate in the state, which
required a written, witnessed, notarized, and recorded act of sale.' Oral
42. Nicholas, supra note 8, at 70-71.
43. Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 390, 401. Rice v. Cade, 10 La. 288 (1836), affirmed the rights
of slaves to be paid for Sunday work. Arthur G. Nuhrah, John McDonogh: Liberal Slaveholder 54,
71-73 (1947); States of Louisiana and Maryland v. Executor of John McDonogh and the City of New
Orleans, No. 2175, 8 La. Ann. 171 (1853).
44. See Judith Kelleher Schafer, Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
(1994).
45. La. Civ. Code art. 174 (1825).
46. Projet, supra note 41, at 14.
47. Schafer, supra note 44, at 8.
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contracts or promises by slave owners did not stand up in court, even if a slave
had paid an owner the full purchase price. In the appeal of Victoire v. Dussuau,
decided in 1816, the plaintiff presented witnesses who testified that they heard
her mistress admit that Victoire had reimbursed her for her entire purchase price,
but the defendant had refused to free her. Chief Judge George Mathews, writing
for the court, declared that Victoire remained a slave: "[P]arol [sic] evidence
ought not be admitted to establish the existence of the contract... because it
tends to dispose of a slave."
The Civil Code of 1825 for the first time also enumerated the rights of
statuliberi, the Roman law term used to describe those who had acquired the
right to be free at a future time. Under the Civil Code of 1825, those slaves with
rights of statuliber! fell under the same disabilities as other slaves, except that
their owners' heirs could not deprive them of their right to freedom.49
Although the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 prohibited slaves from inheriting
anything, statuliberi could have inheritance pass through them to such of their
descendants who may have become free before the probate of a will:
The slave who has acquired the right of being free at a future time, is
from that time, capable of receiving by testament or donation. Property
given or devised to him must be preserved for him, in order to be
delivered to him in kind, when his emancipation shall take place. In the
mean time [sic] it must be administered by a curator."
However, if slaves died without issue before acquiring freedom, the donation or
legacy reverted to the donor.5 The redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 also
protected the right of the children of a female statu liber to her right to freedom:
The child born of a woman after she has acquired the right of being
free at a future time, follows the condition of its mother, and becomes
free at the time fixed for her enfranchisement, even if the mother should
die before that time.52
This provision could work against children of a statu liber becoming free in
advance of their mother. In the 1820 case of Catin v. D'Orgenoy's Heirs, the
statu liber Catin sued for the freedom of her children, born after Catin acquired
the status of a statu liber, but before the condition to free her, the death of her
master, occurred. Presiding Judge George Mathews, writing for the court,
declared that the defendants could continue to hold Catin's children in slavery.
48. Schafer, supra note 44, at 224-34. See Victoire v. Dussuau, No. 103, 4 Mar. (o.s.) 212 (La.
1816).
49. La. Civ. Code arts. 193-196 (1825). Buckland, supra note 1, at 286-88.
50. La. Civ. Code art. 193 (1825).
51. La. Civ. Code art. 195 (1825).
52. La. Civ. Code art. 196 (1825).
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As Catin remained a slave until after the death of her master, the children
remained in slavery as well.3
The most important protection of statuliberi, in Louisiana law, a protection
only implied in Roman law, prohibited taking statuliberi out of the state to
attempt to deny them their freedom. Article 194 granted statuliberi the
extraordinary privilege of appearing in court to claim this protection "where there
[were] good reasons for believing that it [was] intended to carry him out of the
State."' "
The Civil Code of 1825 allowed one informal method of emancipation for
Louisiana slaves somewhat reminiscent of the Roman practice of manumissio
censu, enrolling slaves on the census to grant them freedom and Roman
citizenship. The Civil Code of 1825 offered a weak substitute, manumission by
prescription for slaves over the age of thirty. Although slaves freed in this
manner did not receive citizenship, their owners allowed them to live as free for
ten years within the state or twenty years outside its borders. After the stipulated
period ended, slave owners could not recover possession of them. Even with a
willing owner, this method of emancipation could prove risky to slaves. Owners
might change their minds just before the ten or twenty years ended. Additional-
ly, if owners died before the specified time elapsed, the heirs could take
possession of them, and hold them as slaves or sell them to pay the debts of the
secession or to effect a partition of the property."5
Louisiana lawmakers steadily eliminated the vestiges of the influence of
Roman law on the state's emancipation law after the writing of the Civil Code
of 1825. In 1827, the Louisiana legislature softened the age requirement to
authorize police juries, the bodies that governed parishes in Louisiana, to allow
slave owners of native born slaves younger than thirty years to emancipate
them.3' Roman law held that, generally, a gift of freedom was not condition-
al,57 but Louisiana lawmakers continued to place more and more onerous
restrictions on emancipation. An act of 1830 required all newly freed slaves to
leave the state within thirty days of their emancipation and required the
manumitting owner to post a $1,000 security bond to insure the ex-slave's
53. Catin v. D'Orgenoy's Heirs, No. 459, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 218 (La. 1820). See also Gaudet v.
Gourdain, No. 364, 3 La. Ann. 136 (1848); Baker, f.m.c. v. Tabor, No. 328, 7 La. Ann. 556 (1852);
Henriette, statu liber, v. Arroyo, Unreported Louisiana Supreme Court Case No. 3706 (1854).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 194 (1825).
55. La. Civ. Code art. 3510 (1825). For cases involving prescription, see Meilleur v. Coupry, No.
1726, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 128 (La. 1829); Carmouche v. Carmouche, No. 243, 12 La. Ann. 721 (1857);
Eulalie v. Long & Mabry, No. 3237, 9 La. Ann. 9 (1854); Eulalie v. Long & Mabry, No. 3979, 11
La. Ann. 463 (1856); Euphr6mie, f.w.c. v. Maran, f.w.c. & Noble, alias Jordan, Unreported Louisiana
Supreme Court Case No. 6740, 6741 [filed 1860, decided 1865]. In 1859, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that prescription was abrogated by the 1857 act that forbade all emancipations. George
v. Demouy, No. 5969, 14 La. Ann. 145 (1859).
56. 1827 La. Acts, at 12-14 (An Act to Determine the Mode of Emancipating Slaves Who Have
Not Attained the Age Required by the Civil Code for Their Emancipation).
57. Buckland, supra note 1, at 483.
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departure. Unlike slaves in ancient Rome, who could become Roman citizens,
lawmakers in Louisiana felt that slaves freed in the state had no place in free
society, and indeed, posed a threat to the institution of slavery."
The following year the Louisiana legislature softened the requirement of
leaving the state. Parish police juries could, by a three-fourths vote, allow
emancipated slaves to remain in the state, and any slave freed for "meritorious
conduct" could bypass the restrictions altogether."s
Despite these measures, the population of free persons of color continued to
grow, from 16,710 in 1830 to 25,502 in 1840 to 17,462 in 1850. Part of the
decline in 1850 resulted from strict enforcement of laws to prevent free persons
of color from entering the state. Courts held those found in the state "in
contravention of the law" guilty of a criminal offence. Courts then fined them
(usually $25) and ordered them to leave the state within thirty days. Those not
complying risked reenslavement. Lawmakers used contravention and deportation
as one way to lower the population of free people of color in Louisiana; another
technique, limiting emancipation, provided another."e
In 1852, the Louisiana legislature added another, more formidable obstacle
to emancipation by requiring slave owners to send their freed slaves to Liberia
and to pay $150 for each slave's passage. Former slaves not departing within
twelve months of their emancipation risked reenslavement.6' By 1852, almost
all Louisiana slaves could claim to be American born, and many could claim to
be natives of Louisiana, as the United States government had prohibited the
58. 1830 La. Acts, at 90-94 (An Act to Prevent Free Persons of Color from Entering into this
State).
59. 1831 La. Acts No. 46. at 98-100 (An Act to Amend the Act Entitled "An Act to Prevent Free
Persons of Color from Entering into this State').
60. Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro inthe Antebellum South 136-37 (1974).
1842 La. Acts No. 123, at 308-18 (An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color from
Entering This State). Contravention cases did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana because before 1845, the court did not have criminal jurisdiction, and after 1845 its
criminal jurisdiction extended only to capital cases. Constitutions of the State of Louisiana art. IV,
sec. 2, at 503, tit. IV, art. 63, at .514 (Benjamin W. Dart ed., 1932). For prosecutions of
contravention cases, see cases of the First District Court of New Orleans. State v. William Butler,
f.m.c., No. 128 (July, 1846); State v. William Benjamin, f.m.c., No. 407 (November, 1846); State v.
Louis Francis, alias Henry Eddington and George Henry Morgan, alias Dutch, f.m.c., No. 3031
(November, 1848); State v. Joseph Spencer, f.m.c., No. 4989 (May, 1850). One slave who pleaded
guilty to contravention received a sentence of one year at hard labor in the state penitentiary. State
v. Mary Ann Martin, No. 299 (September, 1846). The law required free people of color to register
themselves, and failing to register was also a criminal offense often receiving a sentence of an hour
or two in jail and a S25 fine. 1843 La. Acts No. 73, at 45.46 (An Act to Amend an Act Approved
the Sixteenth March, 1842, Entitled, "An Act More Effectually to Prevent Free Persons of Color from
Entering into This State, and for Other Purposes'). For prosecutions for failure to record, see these
cases of the First District Court of New Orleans. State v. Thomas Powell, No. 10,876 (May, 1846);
State v. Albert Can, f.w.c., No. 1778 (January, 1848).




importation of slaves from Africa into the Louisiana territory beginning in
1803.62 Few African-Americans expressed the desire to become African-
American-Africans, most had families and friends from whom they did not wish
to part. Thus, slave owners who wished to emancipate their slaves without
having to send them to Liberia flooded the legislature with petitions for
individual exceptions to allow them to remain in the state. 3
In 1855, the Louisiana legislature repealed the requirement of departure for
Liberia. However, new restrictions passed the same year, turned emancipation
over to the state courts. To free their slaves, slave owners had to sue the state
in a district court. Emancipating slave owners had to prove that they held actual
title to the slaves, that no one held mortgages on the slaves, that the slaves had
never committed a crime, that they always behaved well and were of "sober
habits" and "always respectful to white people," and that they could support
themselves. Slave owners wishing to free their slaves had to post a $1,000 bond
that their slaves would not become a public charge. A jury decided the fate of
the slaves seeking freedom, and whether they could remain in the state.6 From
July 1855 to December 1856, the district courts of New Orleans freed hundreds
of slaves with permission to remain in the state. In fact, juries did not deny even
one slave permission to reside in Louisiana.65 In 1856, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana declared the act that allowed this method of emancipation unconstitu-
tional on a technicality." The same year in Henriette v. Heirs of Barnes, the
supreme court stated its opposition to emancipation:* "Its [emancipation's]
tendency is to substitute a free colored population for the system of compulsory
labor, which involves to such a vast extent the fortunes of our citizens and the
production of our agricultural staples." 67 On March 6, 1857, the same day that
62. Joe Gray Taylor, Negro Slavery in Louisiana 35 (1963); Schafer, supra note 44, at 150.
63. For some individual acts of legislative emancipation, see 1853 La. Acts No. 200, at 163-64
(An Act to Enable Baptiste Dupeyrc... to Emancipate the Slave Zoe, Without Removing Her out
of the State); 1853 La. Acts No. 311, at 273-74 (An Act to Emancipate the Slaves Belonging to the
Estate of the Late J.B. Cajus, of the Parish of Orleans); 1854 La. Acts No. 54, at 34-35 (An Act
Authorizing W.C. Wilson to Emancipate His Slave David); 1854 La. Acts No. 55, at 35 (An Act to
Authorize John Cousin, of the Parish of St. Tammany, to Emancipate the Slave Frances and Her
Three Children). Some of these acts stated that the slaves could remain in the state "any law to the
contrary notwithstanding," a repudiation of the legislature's own laws.
64. 1855 La. Acts No. 308, at 377-91 (An Act Relative to Slaves and Free Colored Persons).
65. Generally, in the First Judicial District Court of New Orleans, see Cyrille Labiche, f.m.c. v.
State of Louisiana, No. 10,489 (1855) and Philip Claibome, f.m.c. v. State of Louisiana, No. 10,683
(1855); in the Second Judicial District Court of New Orleans, see Jean Jacques Montreuil, f.m.c. v.
State of Louisiana, No. 9,280 (1855) and Antoine E. Tremoulet v. State of Louisiana, No. 10,094
(1855); in the Fourth Judicial District Court of New Orleans, see Placide Forstall and William Bell
v. State of Louisiana, No. 9,614 (1856) and Emile Outremont v. State of Louisiana, No. 10,060
(1856); in the Fifth Judicial District Court of New Orleans, see Seaborne Powell v. State of
Louisiana, No. 10,997 (1856) and Jean Baptiste Jobert v. State of Louisiana, No. 11,030 (1856). See
also Schafer. supra note 44, at 183 n.5.
66. State v. Harrison, No. 4464, I1 La. Ann. 722 (1856).
67. Henriette, alias Mary v. Heirs of Barnes, No. 3751, 11 La. Ann. 453 (1856).
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Chief Justice Roger B. Taney read the Dred Scott" decision, the Louisiana
legislature prohibited all emancipation.69 Prohibiting emancipation seems the
logical conclusion to the development of the Louisiana law of slavery in a
direction so opposed to the Roman law of slavery.
68. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
69. 1857 La. Acts No. 69, at 55 (An Act to Prohibit the Emancipation of Slaves).
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